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Abstract
The cost and revenue earnings potential of alternative power generation sources has shifted
considerably in recent years. Here we introduce the concept of Levelized Profit Margins
(LPM) to capture the changing unit economics of both intermittent and dispatchable gen-
eration technologies. We apply this framework in the context of the California and Texas
wholesale power markets. Our LPM estimates indicate that solar photovoltaic and wind
power have both substantially improved their competitive position over the years 2012–
2019, primarily due to falling life-cycle costs of production. In California, these gains far
outweigh an emerging “cannibalization” trend that results from substantial additions of so-
lar power having made energy less valuable in the middle of the day. We also find the
competitiveness of natural gas power plants to have either improved or held steady. For
this generation technology, declining capacity utilization rates have effectively been coun-
terbalanced by a “dispatchability price premium” that reflects the growing market share of
intermittent renewables.
Keywords: Renewable Energy, Intermittency, Dispatchable Power, Levelized Cost, Profit
Margins
JEL Codes: M1, O33, Q41, Q42, Q48, Q54, Q55
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1 Introduction
The costs of replacing dispatchable power sources based on fossil fuels with intermittent
renewable power sources remain controversial. The life-cycle cost of renewables, in particular
wind and solar power, is known to have fallen substantially over time1–5. Once deployed,
these power sources also have effective priority in the marketplace due to their zero short-run
production cost. In contrast, the life-cycle cost of traditional dispatchable generation sources
tends to increase due to lower capacity utilization as these facilities are increasingly relegated
to delivering output during hours when intermittent renewables are not available6;7. While
all of these cost effects favor renewable power, countervailing effects emerge on the revenue
side8;9. First, renewables increasingly experience a “cannibalization” effect in jurisdictions
where significant additions of wind or solar power capacity cause market prices to fall during
hours when renewable sources are at peak capacity10–13. A second effect favoring the value
generated by dispatchable energy sources is the price premium they earn at times of limited
supply capacity due to the intermittency of renewables6;14;15.
This paper provides an integrated assessment of the cost and value dynamics of solar
photovoltaic (PV), onshore wind, and natural gas combined-cycle (NGCC) power plants in
the context of the wholesale electricity markets in Texas and California. Our empirical find-
ings are based on a novel metric termed the Levelized Profit Margin (LPM). This metric is
shown to capture the relevant unit economics in terms of dollars per kilowatt-hour (kWh)
for assessing the competitiveness of alternative power generation technologies. Key to the
calculation of this profit margin is that the average market price for electricity in a particular
year and jurisdiction is adjusted by a technology-specific factor that captures the covariance
between real-time fluctuations in electricity prices and optimized capacity utilization rates.
The economic profitability of a power generation facility thus hinges on a weighted aver-
age of the future technology-adjusted unit revenues to exceed the life-cycle cost of energy
generation. A dynamic LPM analysis thus integrates the countervailing competitive effects
due to technological improvements, shifts in capacity utilization, cannibalization, and the
dispatchability price premium.
Our findings indicate that for the most part new capacity investments in both renewables
or natural gas plants undertaken during the years 2012–2019 are thus far not on track to
become economically profitable. This finding may reflect that new investments were based
on criteria that extend beyond expected net present values, such as renewable portfolio stan-
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dards in California or the presence of “impact investors”, such as technology firms investing
in renewable energy projects16;17.
At the same time, our results indicate that the estimated LPMs of new wind and solar
energy projects have improved considerably and, by 2019, approached or exceeded the break-
even value of zero. This finding is primarily due to substantial reductions in the life-cycle
costs of these power sources. In California, the LPM improvements of solar PV have been
partially offset by a tangible cannibalization effect18;19. In contrast, solar PV has achieved
a growing price premium in Texas, a state where solar power today still has a relatively
modest market share.
For NGCC power plants in California, we find that falling capacity utilization rates have
been counterbalanced by increasing dispatchability price premia. These two countervailing
trends have resulted in steady but distinctly negative LPMs. In Texas, by contrast, profit
margins for NGCC plants have improved due to higher utilization rates at times of higher
power prices. This finding is consistent with the general observation that in Texas natural
gas and wind power have gradually replaced coal-fired generation20.
2 Unit Economics of Power Generation Plants
Our model framework considers a market for electricity where prices are determined hourly
based on supply and demand. Electricity supply is provided by competing power generation
technologies that differ in terms of cost and the ability to generate electricity at specific
points in time. Individual suppliers are assumed to be price-takers who can idle their capacity
during times when the prevailing market price falls below the short-run marginal cost. A
comprehensive list of all symbols and acronyms is provided in Supplementary Table 1.
On the cost side, alternative generation technologies can be ranked in terms of the Lev-
elized Cost of Electricity (LCOE)21. This metric aggregates a share of upfront capacity
expenditures and all periodic cash outflows after taxes to arrive at the unit cost of 1 kWh of
electricity for a facility that has a life cycle of T years22. A critical variable in calculating the
LCOE is the anticipated number of hours that the facility will be generating power. Let CFi
denote the share of the available capacity that is expected to be utilized on average in year
i. To highlight the dependence of the LCOE on the anticipated sequence of future capacity
factors ~CF ≡ (CF1, ..., CFT ), we use the notation LCOE( ~CF ). The formal definition of the
LCOE (see Methods) shows that if all electricity output generated over the entire lifetime of
2
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the facility were to be sold for LCOE( ~CF ) per kWh, an investor would break even, because
the stream of discounted future after-tax cash flows will be exactly zero.
On the revenue side, let pi(t) denote the market price for electricity per kWh at which
power is sold at time t of year i. Here, t ∈ [0,m] hours, with m = 8, 760 hours per year.
In addition to the instantaneous market price pi(t), wind power in the United States (U.S.)
is eligible for production tax credits in the after-tax amount of PTCi per kWh of power
generated in year i23.
Our base model assumes that the capacity utilization factor can be chosen flexibly at
each point in time, subject to not exceeding an upper bound b(t) ∈ [0, 1]. For a dispatchable
energy source b(t) = 1 for all t, while for intermittent renewable sources the upper bound b(t)
is determined exogenously by the availability of the natural resource, i.e., solar insolation or
wind speed. Our base model here ignores frictions such as maintenance or delays in the up-
or down-ramping of traditional baseload generation facilities, like nuclear or coal-fired power
plants. The base model is readily extended to incorporate such frictions24.
The optimized capacity factor CF ∗i (t) at time t in year i is chosen so as to maximize:[
pi(t) + PTCi − wi
]
· CFi(t) subject to: 0 ≤ CFi(t) ≤ b(t), (1)
where wi denotes the variable costs incurred during year i. For traditional generation tech-
nology, these costs include fuel, labor, and possibly charges for carbon dioxide (CO2) emis-
sions, while for intermittent renewables, they are effectively zero. Thus, CF ∗i (t) = b(t) if
pi(t) + PTCi ≥ wi, while CF ∗i (t) = 0 otherwise. This capacity utilization rule reflects the
“merit-order approach” in electricity markets: if a particular plant produces at capacity,
other plants with a lower short-run unit cost wi will do the same.
To reflect that a technology in a given market environment will be more valuable if it can
achieve higher capacity utilization during periods of relatively high power prices, let ε∗i (t)
denote the multiplicative deviation of CF ∗i (t) from the annual average value CF
∗
i , while µi(t)
represents the deviation factor of pi(t) from the annual average price, pi. Thus
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Synergies (positive or negative) between prevailing market prices and capacity utilization







ε∗i (t) · µi(t) dt. (3)
The adjusted average unit revenue in year i of a particular generation technology is given
by Γ∗i ·pi. By construction, Γ∗i is above (below) 1.0 whenever a facility produces the majority
of its output during periods of above-average (below-average) electricity prices. In contrast,
Γ∗i would be equal to 1.0 if either all energy is sold at a constant price, or the facility operates
at constant capacity throughout the year25;26.
The annual Levelized Profit Margin is the difference between the adjusted unit revenue,
Γ∗i ·pi, in year i and the LCOE. The significance of this unit profit measure is that investment
in a particular energy generation technology is economically profitable, i.e., generates a
positive net present value for a given market environment, if the aggregate LPM, defined as
a properly weighted average of the annual LPMs, is positive. To state this result formally (see
Methods for the proof), we denote the applicable cost of capital by r and the corresponding
discount factor by γ = 1
1+r
. Since for some generation technologies productive capacity
degrades over time, we introduce the degradation factor xi, representing the fraction of the
initial capacity that is still available in year i.
Proposition: Given a trajectory of future annual electricity price distributions, (p1(·), ..., pT (·)),
and the corresponding optimized annual capacity factors ~CF ∗ ≡ (CF ∗1 , ..., CF ∗T ), investment









CF ∗j ·xj ·γj
.
Since the capacity factors of intermittent energy sources with zero short-run marginal
cost are exogenous, both the weights β∗i and the LCOE are fixed and effectively sunk at the
time of investment for wind and solar PV facilities. The revenue terms, Γ∗i · pi, reflect an in-
vestor’s expectation regarding the average future prices as well as the degree to which hourly
fluctuations in those prices co-vary with a higher capacity utilization for the technology in
4
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question. For dispatchable generation technologies, both future revenue and cost depend on
the optimized capacity factors, reflecting the share of hours for which the prevailing market
price exceeds the short-run marginal cost.
The aggregate LPM reduces to a single annual profit margin in the hypothetical scenario
where both the distributions of prices pi(t) and the unit variable costs wi are expected to be
constant across the years. In such a “stationary environment”, the aggregate LPM is given
by:








·PTCi. For stationary environments, we thus obtain a concise condi-
tion for a competitive equilibrium with normal, that is, zero LPMs: the ratios LCOE(CF
∗)−ptc
Γ∗
must be the same for all active generation technologies and equal to the average market price,
p. For the reasons explained above, we do not expect the zero economic profit condition to
hold in either Texas or California. Nonetheless, we find that for the generation technologies
considered in our empirical analysis the LPMs generally do approach the benchmark value
of zero by the year 2019.
3 Market Dynamics in California and Texas
This section reports numerical values for the main constructs underlying the levelized profit
margins. We do so for natural gas combined-cycle turbines as well as utility-scale solar PV
and onshore wind power installations. Our calculations are based on the day-ahead wholesale
markets in California and Texas. Both states have deregulated their electricity markets and
traditionally obtained a significant share of their electricity from natural gas. Furthermore,
California’s considerable investments in renewable energy have focused on solar PV, while
wind power became the dominant renewable source in Texas27. As detailed in Methods,
our calculations rely on data collected from multiple sources including industry databases,
technical reports, and journal articles. For these sources, the requisite data became available
in their entirety in the year 2012.
Table 1 shows the trajectory of the main cost and price parameters for the years 2012–2019
(details in Methods). The decline in variable costs of NGCC turbines in Texas reflects the
impact of hydraulic fracking on the price of natural gas28. While NGCC plants in California
5
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also experienced falling fuel costs, the resulting variable cost figures remained almost un-
changed because of rising CO2 emission charges under California’s cap-and-trade system
29.
NGCC plants in Texas experienced slightly increasing capacity factors and co-variation co-
efficients that were consistently above one, as these plants began to substitute for coal-based
power generation20. In contrast, NGCC plants in California experienced a relegation effect in
terms of falling utilization rates as renewables expanded their market share6. This comports
with the notion that gas power plants were crowded out by intermittent renewables when-
ever these were available30. At the same time, the corresponding drop in capacity factors
was counterbalanced by rising price premia in the form of co-variation coefficients increasing
from about 1.0 to about 1.2.
Table 1. Dynamics of the central cost and price parameters.
NGCC Solar PV Wind














2012 3.17 2.87 58.75 1.06 4,088 20.83 1.19 2,532 32.13 0.94 2.04
2013 4.48 4.06 55.59 1.03 3,504 21.78 1.06 2,382 34.25 0.97 2.08
2014 5.01 4.56 54.40 1.04 2,967 26.75 1.01 2,198 31.62 0.99 2.05
2015 3.37 3.11 53.80 1.05 2,593 27.67 0.95 2,000 30.99 0.99 2.05
2016 2.96 2.93 44.83 1.11 2,161 27.67 0.90 2,044 33.69 0.98 2.05
2017 3.48 3.41 39.94 1.19 1,986 29.23 0.81 1,959 32.44 0.96 1.67
2018 3.96 3.54 43.45 1.19 1,565 29.59 0.81 1,747 37.74 0.99 1.07
2019 3.55 3.39 42.61 1.15 1,343 28.69 0.70 1,678 34.70 0.92 0.70
Texas
2012 3.01 2.54 52.77 1.11 3,838 21.78 1.45 2,377 39.76 0.89 1.86
2013 3.49 3.10 50.48 1.09 3,289 19.25 1.20 2,236 39.11 0.95 1.89
2014 4.16 3.50 50.11 1.10 2,785 20.82 1.16 2,063 37.72 0.92 1.87
2015 2.74 2.23 56.73 1.10 2,434 20.02 1.35 1,877 33.93 0.89 1.87
2016 2.36 2.05 52.35 1.11 2,028 18.66 1.39 1,918 38.47 0.91 1.86
2017 2.59 2.39 47.71 1.10 1,864 24.39 1.28 1,839 44.37 0.93 1.53
2018 3.37 2.34 53.85 1.17 1,469 26.38 1.48 1,640 41.99 0.85 0.98
2019 3.76 1.87 57.04 1.27 1,261 25.48 1.92 1,575 44.78 0.76 0.64
wi: variable cost in year i ($¢/kWh), CF ∗i : capacity factor in year i (%), v: system price ($/kW), $-values
are in 2019 $US. System prices for gas turbines are omitted here since they remained relatively constant
over the past decade. Differences in ptci between California and Texas result from diverging state rules
for corporate income taxes (details in Methods). The ptc values reflect the scheduled phase-out of this tax
credit, beginning in 2017.
For both wind and solar PV, Table 1 indicates that system prices, denoted by v in $
per kilowatt (kW), fell rapidly while the exogenous capacity factors increased over the past
decade due to technological improvements. This is consistent with the widely reported
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learning-by-doing effects associated with the cumulative deployments of these relatively new
renewable power sources31. The increased capacity factors for solar PV are largely due to
the introduction of axis trackers32, while the higher utilization rates for wind turbines stem
from larger rotors and turbine towers33.
Table 1 shows that for the two dominant renewable power sources, i.e., solar PV in
California and wind energy in Texas, the co-variation coefficients have fallen to 0.70 and
0.76, respectively, by 2019. While in 2012 wind power in Texas already faced a penalty of
5–10% for primary generation at night, solar PV in California still exhibited synergies of
10–20% with market prices that used to be above-average during the day25;26. The steady
and significant decline in the coefficients Γ∗i in California provides a clear illustration of the
cannibalization effect10;19. In contrast, the co-variation coefficients for solar PV in Texas
remained well above one throughout the past decade. Particular peaks occurred in the years
2012, 2018, and 2019 when heat waves in Texas led to strong electricity demand from air
conditioning34.
4 Levelized Profit Margins
We now assess the competitive position of renewable and natural gas power plants in Cali-
fornia and Texas by estimating their levelized profit margins following the model framework
laid out in Section 2. Our analysis yields a trajectory showing how the LPMs for new ca-
pacity investments have evolved in these two jurisdictions over the years 2012–2019. When
investors in Texas sought to gauge the competitiveness of a new wind farm in 2016, for
example, they needed to forecast the distributions of future wholesale market prices. In
considering a natural gas power plant in 2016, investors also needed to forecast the future
operating costs of such facilities. Since we have no direct knowledge of the forecasts and
expectations investors had at these points in time, our estimates are based on alternative
expectation scenarios. In the first scenario, investors are assumed to have anticipated the
distributions of electricity prices, pi(t), and variable costs, wi, with perfect foresight up to
the horizon date of 2019. Beyond that date, investors are assumed to have anticipated a
steady state in which the price distributions and variable operating costs remain constant at
values given by their average across the last three years, that is, 2017–2019. While clearly
ad-hoc, such an expectation scenario amounts to a terminal value calculation, as frequently
employed in equity valuation models35.
7
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The dashed colored lines in Figure 1 show the trajectories of the LCOE of the three
technologies we consider in Texas and California. These LCOE estimates are generally
within the range reported in journal articles and by industry analysts32;33;36;37. As one
might expect, the LCOE estimates of renewables have exhibited particularly fast declines
due to progressively lower system prices and higher capacity factors. Starting in 2018, all
generation technologies experienced a lower unit cost of capacity due to a lower corporate
income tax rate and the possibility of immediate expensing of all new capital investments
for tax purposes (details in Methods). The pattern of weakly decreasing LCOEs for NGCC
plants in both jurisdictions reflects three factors pointing in opposite directions: lower prices
for natural gas and, in the case of California, higher CO2 emissions charges as well as the
relegation effect corresponding to lower capacity utilization at NGCC facilities.
One of the surprising findings shown in Figure 1 is that, except for solar PV in Texas, the
LPMs of the three technologies (given as the difference between the solid and the dashed
colored lines) are for the most part negative in both states. Unless the investing parties had
more favorable future expectations than assumed in our calculations, factors beyond the ex-
pected economic profitability must have motivated new capacity additions. In that context,
it should be noted that in California utilities were subject to a renewable portfolio standard,
and furthermore, NGCC plants could earn revenues by participating in the state’s capacity
market, which are not included in our measure of overnight spot prices. We also note, how-
ever, that there were relatively few capacity additions for NGCC plants in California during
the past decade38. Furthermore, many new renewable power facilities built in both states
were viewed as impact investments. Technology firms, in particular, have long made volun-
tary decarbonization pledges. Carbon-free energy delivered by renewable energy facilities is
then counted as carbon offsets for the emissions associated with grid electricity16;17.
Another general pattern emerging from the findings depicted in Figure 1 is that while
the estimated LPMs were mostly negative for the last decade, they were also consistently
improving, and, except for solar PV in Texas and natural gas in California, all LPMs have
been approaching the benchmark value of zero in recent years. For the renewable power
sources, this must be attributed to the observation that the gains in the LCOE were much
more consequential than any cannibalization effects, even the relatively strong effect on Γ∗i
for solar PV in California. In contrast, Figure 1e shows that solar PV in Texas achieved
substantially positive LPMs due to relatively high co-variation coefficients Γ∗i (Table 1).
8
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b Solar PV in California
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Levelized cost of electricity
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c Wind in California
Average electricity market price
Levelized cost of electricity
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d NGCC in Texas
Average electricity market price
Levelized cost of electricity
Adjusted unit revenues








e Solar PV in Texas
Average electricity market price
Levelized cost of electricity
Adjusted unit revenues








f Wind in Texas
Average electricity market price
Levelized cost of electricity
Adjusted unit revenues
Figure 1. Trajectory of levelized profit margins (scenario 1). a, b, c, d, e, f, This
figure shows the trajectory of levelized profit margins for NGCC turbines in California (a),
solar PV in California (b), onshore wind in California (c), NGCC turbines in Texas (d),
solar PV in Texas (e), and onshore wind in Texas (f) as the difference between the weighted
average of adjusted unit revenues (colored solid lines) and LCOE (colored dashed lines).
Consistent with this trend, recent projections forecast about 5 Gigawatt of new solar capacity
in Texas in 2021, on par with the new additions for wind power39.
As a robustness check to the preceding expectation scenario, we also consider the following
scenario: investors are assumed to again have had perfect foresight until 2019, while beyond
that they are assumed to have relied on external forecasts by the U.S. Energy Information
Administration27. These forecasts project the average price for natural gas to increase mod-
erately over the coming years. Furthermore, average wholesale power prices are expected to
fall slightly due to the growing shares of low-cost renewables. For the hourly distributions of
electricity prices in a particular year, investors are assumed to have extrapolated the recent
price dynamics (details in Methods). These extrapolations effectively magnify the growing
9
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volatility in daily and seasonal wholesale electricity prices40;41.
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Average electricity market price
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b Solar PV in California
Average electricity market price
Levelized cost of electricity
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d NGCC in Texas
Average electricity market price
Levelized cost of electricity
Adjusted unit revenues








e Solar PV in Texas
Average electricity market price
Levelized cost of electricity
Adjusted unit revenues








f Wind in Texas
Average electricity market price
Levelized cost of electricity
Adjusted unit revenues
Figure 2. Trajectory of levelized profit margins (scenario 2). a, b, c, d, e, f, This
figure shows the trajectory of levelized profit margins for NGCC turbines in California (a),
solar PV in California (b), onshore wind in California (c), NGCC turbines in Texas (d),
solar PV in Texas (e), and onshore wind in Texas (f) as the difference between the weighted
average of adjusted unit revenues (colored solid lines) and LCOE (colored dashed lines).
The resulting trajectories of levelized profit margins shown in Figure 2 are generally
consistent with those projected in Figure 1. By construction, the levelized cost estimates of
renewables remains unchanged in this alternative scenario. One notable difference is that
NGCC plants fare worse in this scenario because of the embedded expectation that their
optimized capacity factors will continue to decline in the future. Conversely, the recent LPM
estimates for solar PV are less favorable because the adjusted unit revenues now incorporate
the expectation of a growing cannibalization effect going forward. Our analysis here does not
take into considerations that investors may have anticipated that the installation of storage
devices will ultimately provide limits on the magnitude of the cannibalization effect42;43.
10
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As a final robustness check, we also calculate the LPMs that would emerge in a scenario in
which investors had the naive expectation at each point in time that the future of electricity
prices would remain unchanged from hereon. As argued in Section 2, in such a stationary
environment, the aggregate LPMs reduce to a single annual LPM. As can be seen from
Extended Data Figure 1 shown in Methods, the implied findings are similar to those in
Figure 1 and Figure 2.
5 Concluding Remarks
It is widely understood that an intermittent power generation facility is not necessarily cost
competitive once the average price for electricity in a particular market exceeds the LCOE44.
The levelized profit margin introduced in this paper captures the unit economics of both
intermittent and dispatchable power sources competing with each other in real time. For
both solar PV and wind power in Texas and California, our LPM estimates indicate major
competitive improvements over the past decade, despite the emergence of a cannibalization
effect for solar PV in California. At the same time, the projected profitability of NGCC plans
has improved in Texas, and held steady in California, because losses from lower capacity
utilization have been counterbalanced by temporary price premia available to dispatchable
power sources.
Prospective investors can principally rely on the LPM methodology to forecast the eco-
nomic profitability and the risks associated with further capacity additions in particular
electricity markets. Policymakers can also use an LPM analysis as a tool to “back out”
the subsidies needed for investors to justify additions in renewable generation capacity. As
such, an LPM analysis could extend and complement earlier studies that sought to solve
for a scheduled phase-out of federal tax credits to leave the LCOE of wind and solar power
unchanged over time45.
The analysis in this paper has not taken into consideration the possibility of making
intermittent renewable power generation partly dispatchable by adding energy storage ca-
pabilities46;47. Combined solar PV and battery storage projects have become increasingly
attractive due to recent advances in battery technology and the U.S. federal tax code des-
ignating stationary batteries as solar equipment that is eligible for the same investment tax
credit as solar power installations48;49. We expect an expanded analysis that includes such
combined intermittent generation and storage facilities to generate upper bounds on the mag-
11
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nitude of both the cannibalization effect and the dispatchability price premium identified in
our analysis.
Methods
Levelized Cost of Electricity. Our definition of the LCOE is consistent with the verbal
definition provided in the well known MIT study21 and the formal representation in earlier
life-cycle cost studies26. Suppose the upfront cash expenditure per kW of power generation
capacity is v. This upfront capacity investment inherently reflects a joint cost shared by
all kWhs produced in subsequent periods. To obtain the cost per kWh, this joint cost, v,
is divided by a life-cycle levelization factor that is defined in terms of anticipated hours of
operation by:
L ≡ m ·
T∑
i=1
CFi · xi · γi. (5)
A parallel approach is taken for fixed and variable costs incurred during the subsequent
years of operation. Applicable examples of fixed operating costs include insurance and
maintenance expenditures. In contrast, expenses such as fuel and labor or charges for carbon
dioxide emissions are variable and assumed to increase proportionally with output produced.
For intermittent renewable energy sources, like wind and solar power, variable costs are
effectively zero. With Fi as the fixed costs per kW of installed capacity and wi as the












wi · CFi · xi · γi
L
. (6)
Investments returns are affected by corporate income taxes through i) the corporate tax
rate, 0 < α < 1, and ii) the allowable tax shields for debt and depreciation. If the cost of
capital is taken to be the weighted average cost of capital, the debt tax shield is incorporated
by applying the after-tax cost of debt. The impact of corporate income taxes, including the
influence of applicable investment tax credits, can be summarized by a tax factor, denoted
by ∆ that scales the unit cost of capacity c. We denote by di ≥ 0 the percentage of the initial
capital expenditure that can be deducted as a depreciation charge in year i from revenues
in the calculation of taxable income. By construction,
∑
di = 1. If the tax code allows for
12
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full expensing, d0 = 1. The impact of corporate income taxes can then be summarized by:
∆ =






Here, ITC denotes the investment tax credit that the U.S. federal tax code grants for some
renewable energy sources, specifically for solar PV installations50. The ITC reflects a per-
centage subsidy on the system price that is deducted from the investor’s income tax liability.
At the same time, the book value of the initial investment expenditure is reduced by a factor
of δ ·ITC for tax depreciation purposes. In the U.S., δ = 50% so that an ITC of 30% implies
that for tax purposes the investor can only capitalize 85% of the initial investment.
We also note that the U.S. federal government made two changes to the federal tax code
in 2018 that apply to both traditional and renewable energy facilities: the corporate income
tax rate was lowered from 35.0% to 21.0% and upfront capacity expenditures for new energy
facilities can be fully depreciated in the year of investment51. The derivation of the tax
factor in equation (7) applies to a setting without different tax depreciation and tax credit
rules at the state level. A generalized formulation with both federal and state income taxes,
as applies in California, is provided below.
Combining the preceding elements, we obtain the following definition for the levelized cost
of electricity:
LCOE( ~CF ) = c ·∆ + f + w, (8)
where ~CF = (CF1, ..., CFT ) highlights the dependence of the LCOE on the entire sequence
of capacity utilization rates for the years 1 ≤ i ≤ T .
Proof of the Proposition. For 1 kW of power installed initially, the operating revenue at
time t in year i is given by:







where pi(t) is the price at time t in year i for t ∈ [0,m], m = 8, 760, and PTCoi denotes the
nominal production tax credit in year i. Since these subsidies are not subject to corporate
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The overall pre-tax cash flows in year i per kW of power installed will be represented by









· CFi(t) dt− Fi,
By definition, the investment in 1 kW of power capacity is cost-competitive if and only if
the present value of all after-tax cash flows is non-negative, that is:
T∑
i=1
CFLi · γi − v · (1− ITC) ≥ 0, (9)
where CFLi denotes the after-tax cash flow in year i:
CFLi = CFL
o
i − α · Ii.
The firm’s taxable income in year i, with 0 ≤ i ≤ T is given by:
Ii = CFL
o
i − v · (1− δ · ITC) · di + xi
m∫
0
PTCoi · CFi(t) dt.
The capacity factor at time t in year i will be chosen so as to maximize:
[
pi(t) + PTCi − wi
]
· CFi(t),
where, as defined above, PTCi =
PTCoi
(1−α) . Thus, CF
∗
i (t) = b(t) if pi(t) + PTCi ≥ wi and










pi(t) + PTCi − wi
]












Dividing by (1−α) and recalling the definition of the tax factor in (7), the inequality in (10)
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pi(t) + PTCi − wi
]
· CF ∗i (t) dt− Fi
]
γi ≥ v ·∆. (11)
Since pi(t) ≡ p · µi(t) and CF ∗i (t) ≡ CF ∗i · ε∗i (t), it follows that:
m∫
0
ε∗i (t) dt =
m∫
0
µi(t) dt = m.
Thus inequality (11) holds provided:
T∑
i=1










wi · CF ∗i · xi · γi +
T∑
i=1
Fi · γi + v ·∆.
(12)
By construction of the co-variation coefficients Γ∗i , the left-hand side of (12) is equal to:
T∑
i=1
CF ∗i · xi · γi ·m ·
[
pi · Γ∗i + PTCi
]
.




i · xi · γi and recalling the definitions of w, f , and c in (6),
the right-hand side of (12) reduces to:
w + f + c ·∆ ≡ LCOE( ~CF ∗),
where ~CF ∗ denotes the vector of optimized average capacity factors, ~CF ∗ = (CF ∗1 , ..., CF
∗
T ).
Thus, inequality (12) is satisfied if and only if:
T∑
i=1





CF ∗j ·xj ·γj
.
Corporate Income Taxes at the State Level. Since businesses in California are also
subject to a corporate income tax rate at the state level, we extend the definition of the
effective after-tax production tax credit and the tax factor. Let αf denote the federal income
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tax rate and αs the state income tax rate. State taxes are thereby deductible from the federal
taxable income. It is then convenient to define PTCi =
PTCoi
1−αs−αf ·(1−αs)
, with PTCoi denoting
the nominal production tax credit.
The allowable tax depreciation factors in year i at the federal and state level are denoted
by df,i and ds,i, respectively. If depreciation schedules are shorter than the economic lifetime,
ds,i and df,i are equal to zero in the remaining years. The integrated tax factor comprising
both federal and stae income taxes is then given by:
∆ =
1− ITC − αs ·
T∑
i=0




df,i · (1− δ · ITC) · γi − αs · ds,i · γi
]
1− αs − αf · (1− αs)
. (13)
We note that the federal ITC only reduces a firm’s federal tax liability. The tax factor ∆ is
increasing and convex in both tax rates. It is bounded above by 1/(1− αs − αf · (1− αs)).
A more accelerated tax depreciation schedule reduces ∆. For instance, the federal U.S. tax
code currently allows for new power generation plants to be fully expensed in the year of
investment (df,0 = 1)
51. Thus, ∆ = 1 if both αf = 0 and ITC = 0, as is the case for wind
turbines and NGCC plants in Texas.
Data Collection. Supplementary Tables 2–7 provide annual input parameters for each
technology and state. System prices and fixed operating costs reflect the average values
calculated across the respective power plants installed in a particular year for all three
generation technologies. While system prices for solar PV and wind turbines are provided
by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory32;33, system prices for NGCC turbines are
calculated from data by ABB Velocity Suite38. For solar PV, these system prices include
installations with fixed tilt and axis trackers. Fixed operating costs are calculated for all
technologies from data by ABB Velocity Suite38. Variable costs of NGCC plants comprise
fuel cost, variable expenses for operation and maintenance, and, in the case of California,
charges for CO2 emissions. Variable expenses for operation and maintenance of NGCC
turbines are calculated from data by ABB Velocity Suite38 and reflect national averages
of NGCC plants built in the U.S. in the respective year. All national average values are
adjusted to the price level in either state using averaged city cost indexes by RSMeans52.
Fuel cost for NGCC plants (in $/kWh) are calculated from data by ABB Velocity Suite38
as the average across reported annual average fuel cost per kWh of individual NGCC plants
operating in the respective year in either state. We include in this calculation NGCC plants
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built since the year 2000, because only few new plants have been built in recent years and the
fuel consumption of newer NGCC plants built within the years 2000–2019 does not appear
to differ substantially from the fuel requirements of older plants in the same time period.
Fuel usage thereby refers to the fuel required per kWh of power produced in the respective
year of comparison. Cost of emission allowances for CO2 equivalents in California reflects
the annual average price per ton of CO2 allowance of a particular year
29. Annual average
values for the emission performance (in kg CO2/kWh) of NGCC turbines are calculated
from hourly performance data retrieved from the ABB Velocity Suite38 of individual plants
located in either state.
Capacity factors are also calculated with data from the ABB Velocity Suite38 for all tech-
nologies respectively in two stages. We first obtain the average hourly capacity factors as
reported by individual plants located in either state in a particular year. We then compute
the annual averages across all hours. These reported capacity factors yield close approxima-
tions to the annual average values that are obtained by referring to equation (1). We thus
consider our estimates of the capacity factors to be optimized. This finding is consistent
with the fact that NGCC turbines exhibit a relatively brief and symmetric delay in up- and
down-ramping. While the data available to us provides hourly capacity factors for NGCC
turbines at the individual plant level, our data for the capacity factors of solar and wind only
reflect averages across all solar PV and wind facilities operating in a particular state. Our
capacity factors for renewables thus reflect a blend of older and newer plants. Any potential
bias here appears mitigated by the fact that renewable energy capacity additions have been
grown quickly over the period 2012–201936.
Scenario Calculations. Supplementary Tables 2–7 provide the relevant annual parameters
for the three expectation scenarios. In the second scenario, investors are first assumed to
have anticipated the distributions of electricity prices, pi(t), and variable costs, wi, with
perfect foresight until 2019. Beyond that year, they are assumed to have relied on forecasts
by the U.S. Energy Information Administration27 to obtain the annual average fuel cost
for NGCC plants and the annual average price for electricity, pi. In addition, they are
assumed to have extrapolated the recent dynamics in hourly electricity prices to calculate
the future optimized annual capacity factors of gas turbines, CF ∗i , and the future co-variation
coefficients, Γ∗i , for three generation technologies in question. We recall that the optimized
annual capacity factors of wind and solar power remain unchanged across the lifetime of
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a facility. Our estimation approach for the future values of Γ∗i in Texas and California
are essentially identical for both states. Unless stated otherwise, we therefore describe the
procedures in the subsequent paragraphs in the context of California. Our projections cover
the years 2020–2049, where 2049 marks the end of the useful life for facilities built in 2019.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration provides trajectories of national annual av-
erage natural gas prices and national annual average costs for wholesale power generation27.
These trajectories comprise observations until 2019 and projections from 2020 through 2050.
To obtain future average fuel costs for NGCC turbines in California, we proceed as follows.
The average fuel cost of NGCC turbines in the year 2022, for instance, is given by the pro-
jected price for natural gas in 2022, divided by the observed gas price in 2019 and multiplied
with the observed fuel cost of NGCC turbines in California averaged across the years 2017–
2019. This approach entails the implicit assumptions that the fuel consumption of NGCC
turbines remains constant and that regional price markups are proportional the change in
natural gas prices. A parallel approach is taken to obtain the trajectory of future annual
average wholesale power prices, pi. The projected values are provided in Supplementary
Tables 8 and 9.
Our trajectories of optimized annual capacity factors, CF ∗i , of gas turbines and the annual
co-variation coefficients, Γ∗i , for all three generation technologies are derived in three main
steps. The first two steps estimate the hourly distributions of electricity prices, pi(t), in
a future year. Since we have already estimated future annual average electricity prices,
pi, we determine future hourly electricity prices in accordance with equation (2), that is:
pi(t) = pi · µi(t). In the first main step, we estimate future hourly multiplicative deviation
factors, µi(t). In doing so, we focus, for simplicity, on obtaining these hourly factors for
an average day for each month (January–December) in a projected year (2020–2049). We
denote these average hourly multiplicative deviation factors by µ̄ij(τ), where i refers to the
year, j to the month with j ∈ {1, 2, ..., 12}, and τ to the hour of a day with τ ∈ {0, 1, ..., 23}.
We estimate the average hourly multiplicative deviation factors, µ̄ij(τ), for future years
i ∈ {2020, ..., 2049} by extrapolating the dynamics observed in µ̄ij(τ) over the past years.
These extrapolations are conducted separately for each hour τ ∈ {0, 1, ..., 23} and month
j ∈ {1, ..., 12}. To do that, we calculate the hourly multiplicative deviation factors, µi(t),
of past years according to equation (2) based on the observed electricity price distributions,
pi(t) for the years 2010–2019 in California. For Texas, the requisite data is only available for
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the years 2011–2019. We then calculate µ̄ij(τ) for a given hour τ , month j, and past year i
as the average of the corresponding factors across all days in that month.
Next, we estimate the evolution of these average factors, µ̄ij(τ), for a given hour τ and
month j across the past years i based on a univariate regression with constant elasticity
model of the form: µ̄ij(τ) = µ̄0j(τ) · βi. Based on the resulting parameters, we then project
µ̄ij(τ) for a given hour τ and month j for the future years between 2020 and 2049. These
simple regression estimations yield an average R2 for California of above 0.5 for the hours
between 10:00am–2:00pm, above 0.25 for the hours between 3:00am–9:00am and 3:00pm–
8:00pm, and above 0.1 for the hours between 0:00am–2:00am and 9:00pm–11:00pm. Further
details on these regression results are available upon request.
In the second main step, we winsorize the preceding extrapolations to prevent outlier
values far into the future. Specifically, we restrict the average hourly multiplicative deviation
factors, µ̄ij(τ), for a given hour τ and month j in the year 2020 to lie within ± 10% of a base
value. Thus, if an extrapolated value were to be outside this range, it is set at the nearest
limit. The base value is set as the average of the values for µ̄ij(τ) for a given hour τ and
month j across the years 2017–2019. A parallel approach is taken for the values for µ̄ij(τ)
in the last year of the projection (i.e., 2049), whereby the accepted range is ± 80% of the
corresponding base value. The two range limits of ± 10% and ± 80% appear reasonable,
though admittedly ad-hoc. If a vector of µ̄ij(τ) values for a given hour τ and month j was
adjusted at the beginning and/or the end, we calculate the constant growth parameter βi
that is required to get from the beginning to the end, according to a constant elasticity
function. With this growth parameter and the values for µ̄ij(τ) in 2020 and 2049, we then
interpolate the values for µ̄ij(τ) for the years 2020–2049. Given the projections for µ̄ij(τ)
and pi, we finally calculate future hourly electricity prices by multiplying the two parameters
for each hour τ , month j, and year i, respectively.
In the third main step, we calculate the optimized annual capacity factors, CF ∗i , for NGCC
turbines and co-variation coefficients, Γ∗i , for all three generation technologies. To obtain the
optimized annual capacity factors, CF ∗i , of NGCC turbines, we first determine optimized
hourly capacity factors for an average day for each month in a future year analogous to the
optimization described in equation (1) in Section 2. This calculation relies on the future
hourly electricity prices and cost of fuel calculated before. The variable costs for operation
and maintenance are included in the variable operating cost of NGCC turbines. These costs
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are assumed to remain constant at their averages for the years 2017–2019. In California,
variable operating cost further comprise the price for CO2 allowances which are based on
the emissions of NGCC plants. Introduced in 2012 at $10.0 per ton of CO2, the price floor
for CO2 allowances is set to increase at least 5.0% annually over inflation
29. We assume
that the effective annual increase amounts to 5.5% going forward and that the prices for
CO2 allowances continue to be equal to the price floor, as they have for the most part since
2012. The emission rates are assumed to remain at the average value of the years 2017–2019.
Optimized annual capacity factors of NGCC turbines for a given year are then calculated as
the average across the optimized hourly capacity factors in that year.
To finally obtain future annual co-variation coefficients, Γ∗i , of NGCC turbines, we first
calculate hourly multiplicative deviation factors of capacity utilization, denoted by ε̄∗ij(τ),
analogous to equation (2) based on the optimized hourly and annual capacity factors of
NGCC turbines, as shown above. These deviation factors, ε̄∗ij(τ), and the hourly multi-
plicative deviation factors for electricity prices, µ̄ij(τ), then allow us to calculate monthly
co-variation coefficients for each month in a given year. Annual co-variation coefficients, Γ∗i ,
are finally obtained as the average across the monthly coefficients.
For wind and solar PV power, we again first calculate average hourly multiplicative de-
viation factors of capacity utilization, ε̄∗ij(τ). These calculations are based on the hourly
multiplicative deviation factors, ε∗i (t), of past years (2012–2019) according to equation (2)
and the observed hourly capacity factors, CF ∗i (t). We then calculate ε̄
∗
ij(τ) for a given hour
τ , month j, and past year i as the average of the corresponding factors across all days in that
month. This approach mirrors that of calculating the past µ̄ij(τ), as described above. The
hourly deviation factors, ε̄∗ij(τ) allow us to estimate for each renewable source the monthly
co-variation coefficients and, by implication, the annual co-variation coefficients, Γ∗i .
The third alternative expectation scenario considers the LPMs that would emerge if in-
vestors assumed at each point in time that future cost and price distributions will remain
unchanged in the future. The resulting trajectory of levelized profit margins is shown in
Extended Data Figure 1.
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d NGCC in Texas
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e Solar PV in Texas
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f Wind in Texas
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Extended Data Figure 1. Trajectory of levelized profit margins (scenario 3). a, b,
c, d, e, f, This figure shows the trajectory of levelized profit margins for NGCC turbines in
California (a), solar PV in California (b), onshore wind in California (c), NGCC turbines in
Texas (d), solar PV in Texas (e), and onshore wind in Texas (f) as the difference between the
weighted average of adjusted unit revenues (colored solid lines) and LCOE (colored dashed
lines).
Data availability
The data used in this study are referenced in the main body of the paper and the Supplemen-
tal Information. Data that generated the plots in the paper are provided in the Supplemental
Information. Additional data and information is available from the authors upon reasonable
request.
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Supplementary Table 1. List of symbols and acronyms.
α Corporate income tax rate (%)
βi Intertemporal weights (–)
b(t) Bound on capacity utilization at time t (–)
c Unit cost of capacity ($/kWh)
CFi(t) Capacity factor at time t in year i (%)
CFLi Cash flow in year i ($/kW)
CO2 Carbon dioxide
di Allowable tax depreciation in year i (%)
δ ITC capitalization for depreciation purposes (%)
∆ Tax factor (–)
εi(t) Multiplicative deviation of generation at time t in year i (–)
f Levelized fixed operating cost ($/kWh)
Fi Fixed operating cost per kW in year i ($/kW)
γ Discount factor (–)
Γi Co-variation coefficient in year i (–)
Ii Taxable income in year i ($/kW)
ITC Investment tax credit (%)
kW Kilowatt
kWh Kilowatt hour
L Levelization factor (–)
LCOE Levelized cost of electricity
LPM Levelized profit margin
m Number of hours per year (–)
µi(t) Multiplicative deviation of prices at time t in year i (–)
NGCC Natural gas combined-cycle
pi(t) Selling price for electricity at time t of year i ($/kWh)
ptc Levelized production tax credit ($/kWh)
PTCi Production tax credit in year i ($/kWh)
PV Photovoltaic
r Cost of capital (%)
Revi(t) Operating revenue at time t in year i ($/kW)
T Useful life of capacity (years)
U.S. United States
v System price of capacity ($/kW)
w Levelized variable operating cost ($/kWh)
wi Variable operating cost in year i ($/kWh)
xi Degradation of capacity in year i (%)
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Supplementary Table 2. Cost and Price Dynamics for NGCC in California.
in 2019 $US Source 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Input Parameters
Useful lifetime, T (years) [1] 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
System price, v ($/kW) [2] 1,187 1,166 1,164 1,145 1,204 1,186 1,165 1,119
Fixed operating cost, F ($/kW) [2] 19.75 18.05 17.69 18.39 18.13 15.78 16.42 14.89
Variable operating cost (ex. fuel) ($¢/kWh) [2] 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.08
Fuel cost ($¢/kWh) [2] 2.35 3.45 4.00 2.54 2.38 2.88 2.97 2.77
CO2 emission cost ($/t CO2) [3] 11.18 13.97 12.65 13.30 13.42 14.84 15.21 16.84
Emission Performance (kg/kWh) [2] 0.38 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.32
Capacity factor, CF ∗i (%) [2] 58.75 55.59 54.40 53.80 44.83 39.94 43.45 42.61
Cost of capital, r (%) [4, 13] 5.47 5.46 5.25 4.92 4.68 4.80 5.15 4.50
Degradation factor, x (%) [1, 5, 6] 99.60 99.60 99.60 99.60 99.60 99.60 99.60 99.60
Investment tax credit, ITC (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ITC capitalization, δ (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Production tax credit, PTCoi ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
State tax rate, αs (%) [9] 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84
Federal tax rate, αf (%) [10] 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 21.00 21.00
State tax depreciation method (–)* [11] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Federal tax depreciation method (–)* [11] 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5
Average wholesale power price, pi ($¢/kWh) [2] 3.17 4.48 5.01 3.37 2.96 3.48 3.96 3.55
Scenario 1
Cost of capacity, c ($¢/kWh) 2.13 2.13 2.12 2.05 2.14 2.14 2.18 1.95
Tax factor, ∆ (–) 1.26 1.26 1.25 1.24 1.23 1.23 1.03 1.03
Fixed operating cost, f ($¢/kWh) 0.52 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.51 0.45 0.46 0.42
Variable operating cost, w ($¢/kWh) 3.49 3.55 3.50 3.39 3.43 3.44 3.46 3.44
LCOE ($¢/kWh) 6.68 6.71 6.64 6.44 6.57 6.53 6.18 5.88
Adjusted unit revenue ($¢/kWh) 4.21 4.29 4.26 4.18 4.24 4.31 4.32 4.29
Levelized profit margin ($¢/kWh) -2.47 -2.42 -2.38 -2.26 -2.32 -2.22 -1.86 -1.58
Scenario 2
Cost of capacity, c ($¢/kWh) 2.58 2.66 2.74 2.77 3.01 3.13 3.27 3.12
Tax factor, ∆ (–) 1.26 1.26 1.25 1.24 1.23 1.23 1.03 1.03
Fixed operating cost, f ($¢/kWh) 0.63 0.60 0.62 0.69 0.72 0.65 0.70 0.68
Variable operating cost, w ($¢/kWh) 3.74 3.86 3.85 3.77 3.89 3.98 4.04 4.14
LCOE ($¢/kWh) 7.61 7.80 7.90 7.89 8.32 8.49 8.13 8.04
Adjusted unit revenue ($¢/kWh) 4.35 4.47 4.47 4.41 4.53 4.67 4.72 4.77
Levelized profit margin ($¢/kWh) -3.26 -3.33 -3.43 -3.48 -3.78 -3.82 -3.41 -3.27
Scenario 3
Cost of capacity, c ($¢/kWh) 1.65 1.71 1.71 1.64 2.01 2.25 2.11 1.92
Tax factor, ∆ (–) 1.26 1.26 1.25 1.24 1.23 1.23 1.03 1.03
Fixed operating cost, f ($¢/kWh) 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.42
Variable operating cost, w ($¢/kWh) 2.87 4.06 4.56 3.11 2.93 3.41 3.54 3.39
LCOE ($¢/kWh) 5.35 6.59 7.07 5.54 5.88 6.66 6.17 5.79
Co-variation coefficient, Γ∗i (–) 1.06 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.11 1.19 1.19 1.15
Production tax credit, ptc ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adjusted unit revenue ($¢/kWh) 3.36 4.62 5.20 3.53 3.29 4.12 4.71 4.09
Levelized profit margin ($¢/kWh) -1.99 -1.97 -1.87 -2.01 -2.59 -2.54 -1.46 -1.71
*3: 20 year 150%-declining balance depreciation schedule, 5: 100% bonus depreciation.
[1]53, [2]38, [3]54, [4]55, [5]56, [6]57, [7]58, [8]23, [9]59, [10]60, [11]51, [12]32, [13]33.
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Supplementary Table 3. Cost and Price Dynamics for Solar PV in California.
in 2019 $US Source 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Input Parameters
Useful lifetime, T (years) [1] 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
System price, v ($/kW) [12] 4,088 3,504 2,967 2,593 2,161 1,986 1,565 1,343
Fixed operating cost, F ($/kW) [2] 12.39 12.90 11.28 9.15 6.92 6.79 8.27 8.81
Variable operating cost (ex. fuel) ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fuel cost ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CO2 emission cost ($/t CO2) [3] 10.09 12.83 11.65 12.44 12.73 14.30 14.91 16.84
Emission Performance (kg/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Capacity factor, CF ∗i (%) [2] 20.83 21.78 26.75 27.67 27.67 29.23 29.59 28.69
Cost of capital, r (%) [4, 13] 5.47 5.46 5.25 4.92 4.68 4.80 5.15 4.50
Degradation factor, x (%) [1, 5, 6] 99.50 99.50 99.50 99.50 99.50 99.50 99.50 99.50
Investment tax credit, ITC (%) [7] 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00
ITC capitalization, δ (%) [1] 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
Production tax credit, PTCoi ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
State tax rate, αs (%) [9] 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84
Federal tax rate, αf (%) [10] 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 21.00 21.00
State tax depreciation method (–)* [11] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Federal tax depreciation method (–)* [11] 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 5
Average wholesale power price, pi ($¢/kWh) [2] 3.17 4.48 5.01 3.37 2.96 3.48 3.96 3.55
Scenario 1
Cost of capacity, c ($¢/kWh) 16.20 13.26 8.94 7.28 5.91 5.21 4.22 3.47
Tax factor, ∆ (–) 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.66
Fixed operating cost, f ($¢/kWh) 0.72 0.71 0.51 0.40 0.30 0.28 0.34 0.37
Variable operating cost, w ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LCOE ($¢/kWh) 11.84 9.81 6.61 5.34 4.28 3.80 3.13 2.66
Adjusted unit revenue ($¢/kWh) 3.16 3.12 2.99 2.84 2.82 2.83 2.83 2.81
Levelized profit margin ($¢/kWh) -8.67 -6.70 -3.62 -2.49 -1.46 -0.97 -0.29 0.15
Scenario 2
Cost of capacity, c ($¢/kWh) 16.20 13.26 8.94 7.28 5.91 5.21 4.22 3.47
Tax factor, ∆ (–) 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.66
Fixed operating cost, f ($¢/kWh) 0.72 0.71 0.51 0.40 0.30 0.28 0.34 0.37
Variable operating cost, w ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LCOE ($¢/kWh) 11.84 9.81 6.61 5.34 4.28 3.80 3.13 2.66
Adjusted unit revenue ($¢/kWh) 2.73 2.64 2.46 2.25 2.16 2.12 2.07 1.96
Levelized profit margin ($¢/kWh) -9.11 -7.18 -4.16 -3.09 -2.12 -1.68 -1.05 -0.69
Scenario 3
Cost of capacity, c ($¢/kWh) 16.20 13.26 8.94 7.28 5.91 5.21 4.22 3.47
Tax factor, ∆ (–) 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.66
Fixed operating cost, f ($¢/kWh) 0.72 0.71 0.51 0.40 0.30 0.28 0.34 0.37
Variable operating cost, w ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LCOE ($¢/kWh) 11.84 9.81 6.61 5.34 4.28 3.80 3.13 2.66
Co-variation coefficient, Γ∗i (–) 1.19 1.06 1.01 0.95 0.90 0.81 0.81 0.70
Production tax credit, ptc ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adjusted unit revenue ($¢/kWh) 3.76 4.75 5.03 3.21 2.66 2.80 3.19 2.50
Levelized profit margin ($¢/kWh) -8.08 -5.06 -1.58 -2.13 -1.62 -1.00 0.06 -0.16
*2: 5-year MACRS DDB depreciation, 3: 20 year 150%-declining balance depreciation, 5: 100% bonus depreciation.
[1]53, [2]38, [3]54, [4]55, [5]56, [6]57, [7]58, [8]23, [9]59, [10]60, [11]51, [12]32, [13]33.
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Supplementary Table 4. Cost and Price Dynamics for Wind in California.
in 2019 $US Source 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Input Parameters
Useful lifetime, T (years) [1] 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
System price, v ($/kW) [13] 2,532 2,382 2,198 2,000 2,044 1,959 1,747 1,678
Fixed operating cost, F ($/kW) [2] 21.30 25.27 22.10 20.04 24.35 25.76 23.07 21.94
Variable operating cost (ex. fuel) ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fuel cost ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CO2 emission cost ($/t CO2) [3] 10.09 12.83 11.65 12.44 12.73 14.30 14.91 16.84
Emission Performance (kg/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Capacity factor, CF ∗i (%) [2] 32.13 34.25 31.62 30.99 33.69 32.44 37.74 34.70
Cost of capital, r (%) [4, 13] 5.47 5.46 5.25 4.92 4.68 4.80 5.15 4.50
Degradation factor, x (%) [1, 5, 6] 99.20 99.20 99.20 99.20 99.20 99.20 99.20 99.20
Investment tax credit, ITC (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ITC capitalization, δ (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Production tax credit, PTCoi ($¢/kWh) [8] 2.22 2.26 2.26 2.30 2.33 1.90 1.45 0.98
State tax rate, αs (%) [9] 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84
Federal tax rate, αf (%) [10] 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 21.00 21.00
State tax depreciation method (–)* [11] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Federal tax depreciation method (–)* [11] 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 5
Average wholesale power price, pi ($¢/kWh) [2] 3.17 4.48 5.01 3.37 2.96 3.48 3.96 3.55
Scenario 1
Cost of capacity, c ($¢/kWh) 6.71 5.91 5.78 5.18 4.74 4.78 3.81 3.70
Tax factor, ∆ (–) 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.11 1.10 1.10 1.03 1.03
Fixed operating cost, f ($¢/kWh) 0.82 0.92 0.87 0.80 0.90 0.99 0.76 0.79
Variable operating cost, w ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LCOE ($¢/kWh) 8.31 7.51 7.29 6.53 6.12 6.27 4.70 4.61
Adjusted unit revenue ($¢/kWh) 5.62 5.70 5.62 5.51 5.52 5.19 4.60 4.20
Levelized profit margin ($¢/kWh) -2.69 -1.82 -1.68 -1.02 -0.60 -1.08 -0.10 -0.41
Scenario 2
Cost of capacity, c ($¢/kWh) 6.71 5.91 5.78 5.18 4.74 4.78 3.81 3.70
Tax factor, ∆ (–) 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.11 1.10 1.10 1.03 1.03
Fixed operating cost, f ($¢/kWh) 0.82 0.92 0.87 0.80 0.90 0.99 0.76 0.79
Variable operating cost, w ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LCOE ($¢/kWh) 8.31 7.51 7.29 6.53 6.12 6.27 4.70 4.61
Adjusted unit revenue ($¢/kWh) 5.43 5.50 5.40 5.28 5.27 4.92 4.32 3.90
Levelized profit margin ($¢/kWh) -2.88 -2.02 -1.89 -1.26 -0.85 -1.35 -0.38 -0.71
Scenario 3
Cost of capacity, c ($¢/kWh) 6.71 5.91 5.78 5.18 4.74 4.78 3.81 3.70
Tax factor, ∆ (–) 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.11 1.10 1.10 1.03 1.03
Fixed operating cost, f ($¢/kWh) 0.82 0.92 0.87 0.80 0.90 0.99 0.76 0.79
Variable operating cost, w ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LCOE ($¢/kWh) 8.31 7.51 7.29 6.53 6.12 6.27 4.70 4.61
Co-variation coefficient, Γ∗i (–) 0.94 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.92
Production tax credit, ptc ($¢/kWh) 2.04 2.08 2.05 2.05 2.05 1.67 1.07 0.70
Adjusted unit revenue ($¢/kWh) 5.01 6.41 7.00 5.40 4.94 5.02 5.00 3.97
Levelized profit margin ($¢/kWh) -3.30 -1.10 -0.29 -1.13 -1.19 -1.25 0.30 -0.64
*2: 5-year MACRS DDB depreciation, 3: 20 year 150%-declining balance depreciation, 5: 100% bonus depreciation.
[1]53, [2]38, [3]54, [4]55, [5]56, [6]57, [7]58, [8]23, [9]59, [10]60, [11]51, [12]32, [13]33.
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Supplementary Table 5. Cost and Price Dynamics for NGCC in Texas.
in 2019 $US Source 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Input Parameters
Useful lifetime, T (years) [1] 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
System price, v ($/kW) [2] 1,114 1,094 1,093 1,075 1,130 1,113 1,094 1,050
Fixed operating cost, F ($/kW) [2] 18.54 16.94 16.61 17.26 17.02 14.81 15.41 13.97
Variable operating cost (ex. fuel) ($¢/kWh) [2] 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.07
Fuel cost ($¢/kWh) [2] 2.45 2.99 3.39 2.15 1.96 2.32 2.25 1.80
CO2 emission cost ($/t CO2) [3] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Emission Performance (kg/kWh) [2] 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.39
Capacity factor, CF ∗i (%) [2] 52.77 50.48 50.11 56.73 52.35 47.71 53.85 57.04
Cost of capital, r (%) [4, 13] 5.47 5.46 5.25 4.92 4.68 4.80 5.15 4.50
Degradation factor, x (%) [1, 5, 6] 99.60 99.60 99.60 99.60 99.60 99.60 99.60 99.60
Investment tax credit, ITC (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ITC capitalization, δ (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Production tax credit, PTCoi ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
State tax rate, αs (%) [9] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Federal tax rate, αf (%) [10] 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 21.00 21.00
State tax depreciation method (–)* [11] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Federal tax depreciation method (–)* [11] 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5
Average wholesale power price, pi ($¢/kWh) [2] 3.01 3.49 4.16 2.74 2.36 2.59 3.37 3.76
Scenario 1
Cost of capacity, c ($¢/kWh) 1.73 1.69 1.65 1.56 1.60 1.60 1.62 1.45
Tax factor, ∆ (–) 1.20 1.20 1.19 1.19 1.18 1.18 1.00 1.00
Fixed operating cost, f ($¢/kWh) 0.42 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.38 0.33 0.35 0.31
Variable operating cost, w ($¢/kWh) 2.36 2.35 2.29 2.19 2.20 2.19 2.19 2.17
LCOE ($¢/kWh) 4.85 4.77 4.64 4.43 4.47 4.42 4.16 3.94
Adjusted unit revenue ($¢/kWh) 3.75 3.78 3.78 3.74 3.79 3.87 3.93 3.92
Levelized profit margin ($¢/kWh) -1.10 -0.98 -0.85 -0.69 -0.68 -0.55 -0.23 -0.01
Scenario 2
Cost of capacity, c ($¢/kWh) 2.12 2.13 2.14 2.11 2.26 2.33 2.42 2.31
Tax factor, ∆ (–) 1.20 1.20 1.19 1.19 1.18 1.18 1.00 1.00
Fixed operating cost, f ($¢/kWh) 0.51 0.48 0.49 0.52 0.54 0.49 0.52 0.50
Variable operating cost, w ($¢/kWh) 2.49 2.49 2.44 2.34 2.36 2.37 2.38 2.40
LCOE ($¢/kWh) 5.55 5.54 5.49 5.36 5.57 5.61 5.32 5.21
Adjusted unit revenue ($¢/kWh) 3.84 3.89 3.91 3.87 3.98 4.11 4.22 4.28
Levelized profit margin ($¢/kWh) -1.71 -1.65 -1.58 -1.48 -1.59 -1.50 -1.09 -0.92
Scenario 3
Cost of capacity, c ($¢/kWh) 1.72 1.77 1.74 1.46 1.62 1.77 1.60 1.35
Tax factor, ∆ (–) 1.20 1.20 1.19 1.19 1.18 1.18 1.00 1.00
Fixed operating cost, f ($¢/kWh) 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.39 0.37 0.34 0.29
Variable operating cost, w ($¢/kWh) 2.54 3.10 3.50 2.23 2.05 2.39 2.34 1.87
LCOE ($¢/kWh) 5.03 5.62 5.97 4.32 4.34 4.85 4.28 3.51
Co-variation coefficient, Γ∗i (–) 1.11 1.09 1.10 1.10 1.11 1.10 1.17 1.27
Production tax credit, ptc ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adjusted unit revenue ($¢/kWh) 3.35 3.81 4.56 3.03 2.63 2.86 3.96 4.77
Levelized profit margin ($¢/kWh) -1.68 -1.81 -1.41 -1.30 -1.72 -1.99 -0.32 1.26
*3: 20 year 150%-declining balance depreciation schedule, 5: 100% bonus depreciation.
[1]53, [2]38, [3]54, [4]55, [5]56, [6]57, [7]58, [8]23, [9]59, [10]60, [11]51, [12]32, [13]33.
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Supplementary Table 6. Cost and Price Dynamics for Solar PV in Texas.
in 2019 $US Source 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Input Parameters
Useful lifetime, T (years) [1] 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
System price, v ($/kW) [12] 3,838 3,289 2,785 2,434 2,028 1,864 1,469 1,261
Fixed operating cost, F ($/kW) [2] 12.98 10.12 11.16 8.58 7.22 6.70 8.52 9.03
Variable operating cost (ex. fuel) ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fuel cost ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CO2 emission cost ($/t CO2) [3] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Emission Performance (kg/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Capacity factor, CF ∗i (%) [2] 21.78 19.25 20.82 20.02 18.66 24.39 26.38 25.48
Cost of capital, r (%) [4, 13] 5.47 5.46 5.25 4.92 4.68 4.80 5.15 4.50
Degradation factor, x (%) [1, 5, 6] 99.50 99.50 99.50 99.50 99.50 99.50 99.50 99.50
Investment tax credit, ITC (%) [7] 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00
ITC capitalization, δ (%) [1] 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
Production tax credit, PTCoi ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
State tax rate, αs (%) [9] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Federal tax rate, αf (%) [10] 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 21.00 21.00
State tax depreciation method (–)* [11] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Federal tax depreciation method (–)* [11] 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 5
Average wholesale power price, pi ($¢/kWh) [2] 3.01 3.49 4.16 2.74 2.36 2.59 3.37 3.76
Scenario 1
Cost of capacity, c ($¢/kWh) 14.54 14.08 10.77 9.45 8.22 5.86 4.44 3.67
Tax factor, ∆ (–) 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.66
Fixed operating cost, f ($¢/kWh) 0.72 0.63 0.65 0.52 0.47 0.33 0.39 0.43
Variable operating cost, w ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LCOE ($¢/kWh) 10.63 10.23 7.96 6.90 6.00 4.28 3.32 2.85
Adjusted unit revenue ($¢/kWh) 4.84 4.88 4.93 4.95 5.05 5.17 5.29 5.30
Levelized profit margin ($¢/kWh) -5.79 -5.35 -3.03 -1.95 -0.96 0.88 1.97 2.46
Scenario 2
Cost of capacity, c ($¢/kWh) 14.54 14.08 10.77 9.45 8.22 5.86 4.44 3.67
Tax factor, ∆ (–) 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.66
Fixed operating cost, f ($¢/kWh) 0.72 0.63 0.65 0.52 0.47 0.33 0.39 0.43
Variable operating cost, w ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LCOE ($¢/kWh) 10.63 10.23 7.96 6.90 6.00 4.28 3.32 2.85
Adjusted unit revenue ($¢/kWh) 4.06 4.03 4.00 3.92 3.92 3.95 4.00 3.89
Levelized profit margin ($¢/kWh) -6.57 -6.20 -3.97 -2.98 -2.09 -0.33 0.68 1.04
Scenario 3
Cost of capacity, c ($¢/kWh) 14.54 14.08 10.77 9.45 8.22 5.86 4.44 3.67
Tax factor, ∆ (–) 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.66
Fixed operating cost, f ($¢/kWh) 0.72 0.63 0.65 0.52 0.47 0.33 0.39 0.43
Variable operating cost, w ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LCOE ($¢/kWh) 10.63 10.23 7.96 6.90 6.00 4.28 3.32 2.85
Co-variation coefficient, Γ∗i (–) 1.45 1.20 1.16 1.35 1.39 1.28 1.48 1.92
Production tax credit, ptc ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adjusted unit revenue ($¢/kWh) 4.35 4.20 4.82 3.69 3.28 3.32 4.99 7.22
Levelized profit margin ($¢/kWh) -6.27 -6.02 -3.14 -3.21 -2.72 -0.97 1.67 4.37
*2: 5-year MACRS DDB depreciation, 3: 20 year 150%-declining balance depreciation, 5: 100% bonus depreciation.
[1]53, [2]38, [3]54, [4]55, [5]56, [6]57, [7]58, [8]23, [9]59, [10]60, [11]51, [12]32, [13]33.
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Supplementary Table 7. Cost and Price Dynamics for Wind in Texas.
in 2019 $US Source 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Input Parameters
Useful lifetime, T (years) [1] 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
System price, v ($/kW) [13] 2,377 2,236 2,063 1,877 1,918 1,839 1,640 1,575
Fixed operating cost, F ($/kW) [2] 25.51 24.97 20.88 18.33 23.12 24.02 23.50 20.79
Variable operating cost (ex. fuel) ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fuel cost ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CO2 emission cost ($/t CO2) [3] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Emission Performance (kg/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Capacity factor, CF ∗i (%) [2] 39.76 39.11 37.72 33.93 38.47 44.37 41.99 44.78
Cost of capital, r (%) [4, 13] 5.47 5.46 5.25 4.92 4.68 4.80 5.15 4.50
Degradation factor, x (%) [1, 5, 6] 99.20 99.20 99.20 99.20 99.20 99.20 99.20 99.20
Investment tax credit, ITC (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ITC capitalization, δ (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Production tax credit, PTCoi ($¢/kWh) [8] 2.22 2.26 2.26 2.30 2.33 1.90 1.45 0.98
State tax rate, αs (%) [9] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Federal tax rate, αf (%) [10] 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 21.00 21.00
State tax depreciation method (–)* [11] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Federal tax depreciation method (–)* [11] 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 5
Average wholesale power price, pi ($¢/kWh) [2] 3.01 3.49 4.16 2.74 2.36 2.59 3.37 3.76
Scenario 1
Cost of capacity, c ($¢/kWh) 5.09 4.86 4.55 4.44 3.90 3.28 3.21 2.69
Tax factor, ∆ (–) 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.00 1.00
Fixed operating cost, f ($¢/kWh) 0.80 0.79 0.69 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.70 0.58
Variable operating cost, w ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LCOE ($¢/kWh) 6.26 6.01 5.55 5.41 4.89 4.17 3.91 3.27
Adjusted unit revenue ($¢/kWh) 4.64 4.68 4.62 4.53 4.55 4.25 3.72 3.37
Levelized profit margin ($¢/kWh) -1.62 -1.33 -0.94 -0.88 -0.35 0.07 -0.19 0.10
Scenario 2
Cost of capacity, c ($¢/kWh) 5.09 4.86 4.55 4.44 3.90 3.28 3.21 2.69
Tax factor, ∆ (–) 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.00 1.00
Fixed operating cost, f ($¢/kWh) 0.80 0.79 0.69 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.70 0.58
Variable operating cost, w ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LCOE ($¢/kWh) 6.26 6.01 5.55 5.41 4.89 4.17 3.91 3.27
Adjusted unit revenue ($¢/kWh) 4.47 4.49 4.41 4.29 4.28 3.95 3.41 3.02
Levelized profit margin ($¢/kWh) -1.79 -1.52 -1.15 -1.12 -0.61 -0.22 -0.50 -0.25
Scenario 3
Cost of capacity, c ($¢/kWh) 5.09 4.86 4.55 4.44 3.90 3.28 3.21 2.69
Tax factor, ∆ (–) 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.00 1.00
Fixed operating cost, f ($¢/kWh) 0.80 0.79 0.69 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.70 0.58
Variable operating cost, w ($¢/kWh) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LCOE ($¢/kWh) 6.26 6.01 5.55 5.41 4.89 4.17 3.91 3.27
Co-variation coefficient, Γ∗i (–) 0.89 0.95 0.92 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.85 0.76
Production tax credit, ptc ($¢/kWh) 1.86 1.89 1.87 1.87 1.86 1.53 0.98 0.64
Adjusted unit revenue ($¢/kWh) 4.54 5.20 5.72 4.31 4.02 3.94 3.85 3.52
Levelized profit margin ($¢/kWh) -1.72 -0.81 0.16 -1.10 -0.88 -0.23 -0.05 0.24
*2: 5-year MACRS DDB depreciation, 3: 20 year 150%-declining balance depreciation, 5: 100% bonus depreciation.
[1]53, [2]38, [3]54, [4]55, [5]56, [6]57, [7]58, [8]23, [9]59, [10]60, [11]51, [12]32, [13]33.
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Supplementary Table 8. Projected cost and price parameters in California.
NGCC Solar PV Wind









2020 3.47 3.34 44.44 1.19 0.74 0.92
2021 3.45 3.44 40.97 1.23 0.72 0.92
2022 3.40 3.47 39.93 1.25 0.70 0.92
2023 3.35 3.53 38.54 1.28 0.68 0.93
2024 3.36 3.67 36.11 1.31 0.67 0.93
2025 3.39 3.96 31.94 1.36 0.65 0.94
2026 3.41 4.27 25.35 1.42 0.63 0.94
2027 3.42 4.47 22.57 1.47 0.62 0.95
2028 3.37 4.61 20.49 1.51 0.60 0.95
2029 3.32 4.67 19.10 1.55 0.59 0.96
2030 3.28 4.67 20.14 1.57 0.58 0.97
2031 3.23 4.66 20.14 1.60 0.57 0.98
2032 3.18 4.74 19.44 1.63 0.55 0.98
2033 3.18 4.86 19.10 1.67 0.54 0.99
2034 3.17 4.97 18.75 1.70 0.53 1.00
2035 3.12 5.03 18.40 1.74 0.52 1.01
2036 3.09 5.09 18.40 1.77 0.51 1.02
2037 3.07 5.21 17.36 1.81 0.51 1.03
2038 3.07 5.31 17.01 1.85 0.50 1.05
2039 3.05 5.39 16.32 1.89 0.49 1.06
2040 3.01 5.48 15.28 1.94 0.48 1.07
2041 2.99 5.56 15.28 1.98 0.47 1.08
2042 2.97 5.67 14.93 2.03 0.47 1.10
2043 2.95 5.79 14.58 2.07 0.46 1.11
2044 2.95 5.90 14.58 2.11 0.46 1.12
2045 2.94 6.03 14.24 2.16 0.45 1.14
2046 2.92 6.18 13.19 2.21 0.45 1.15
2047 2.93 6.34 12.85 2.26 0.44 1.17
2048 2.93 6.50 12.50 2.32 0.44 1.18
2049 2.92 6.65 11.81 2.37 0.43 1.20
pi: average electricity market price in year i ($¢/kWh), wi: variable operating cost in year i ($¢/kWh),
CF ∗i : capacity factor in year i (%), Γ
∗
i : co-variation coefficient in year i (–), $-values are in 2019 $US.
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Supplementary Table 9. Projected cost and price parameters in Texas.
NGCC Solar PV Wind









2020 3.08 2.10 61.46 1.17 1.36 0.88
2021 3.05 2.15 60.07 1.17 1.34 0.87
2022 3.01 2.15 55.21 1.20 1.33 0.86
2023 2.97 2.17 53.47 1.21 1.32 0.85
2024 2.97 2.25 47.57 1.26 1.31 0.85
2025 3.00 2.44 40.28 1.34 1.30 0.84
2026 3.02 2.63 30.56 1.50 1.29 0.83
2027 3.03 2.76 26.74 1.58 1.28 0.83
2028 2.99 2.83 25.00 1.62 1.28 0.82
2029 2.94 2.84 23.61 1.66 1.27 0.81
2030 2.91 2.80 23.61 1.66 1.26 0.81
2031 2.86 2.77 23.61 1.66 1.26 0.80
2032 2.82 2.78 22.22 1.70 1.25 0.80
2033 2.82 2.83 21.18 1.74 1.25 0.79
2034 2.80 2.87 20.49 1.77 1.24 0.79
2035 2.76 2.87 19.44 1.81 1.24 0.78
2036 2.74 2.86 19.10 1.83 1.23 0.78
2037 2.72 2.90 18.40 1.86 1.23 0.78
2038 2.72 2.92 18.40 1.87 1.23 0.77
2039 2.70 2.93 16.67 1.95 1.23 0.77
2040 2.67 2.94 16.32 1.98 1.22 0.77
2041 2.65 2.93 16.32 1.99 1.22 0.76
2042 2.63 2.95 15.97 2.02 1.22 0.76
2043 2.61 2.97 15.97 2.03 1.22 0.76
2044 2.61 2.98 15.97 2.04 1.22 0.75
2045 2.60 3.00 15.63 2.07 1.22 0.75
2046 2.59 3.02 15.63 2.09 1.22 0.75
2047 2.60 3.06 15.28 2.12 1.22 0.75
2048 2.59 3.09 15.28 2.14 1.22 0.75
2049 2.58 3.10 15.28 2.15 1.22 0.74
pi: average electricity market price in year i ($¢/kWh), wi: variable operating cost in year i ($¢/kWh),
CF ∗i : capacity factor in year i (%), Γ
∗
i : co-variation coefficient in year i (–), $-values are in 2019 $US.
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